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Abstract
Inductive game theory captures how a player inductively derives his/her personal views from
experiences. The player may have multiple views, some of which differ from the objective situation,
but may revise them with further experiences. This paper gives a logical formulation of this revision
process by focusing on the role of player’s beliefs. For this objective, we take the AGM approach of
belief revision. The idea behind our logic is that the player’s belief state is represented by a belief
set of propositional formulas, thereby describing a revision process for the belief states by using
a revision operation in AGM theory. In this setting, the player’s personal views are described as
models for the current belief set. We also present an application of our framework to a class of
inductive games, called festival games, and show how to derive prejudices and discrimination in
society.
JEL Classification : A12; C70; D83.
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1. Introduction and Overview
Standard game theory assumes players to have sufficient knowledge or com-
mon belief of the game they play. However, in a real social or economic
situation, such knowledge/belief is not given in advance, but rather emerges
from the experiences of individuals with bounded cognitive abilities and is re-
vised through time. Inductive game theory, originally introduced by Kaneko
and Matsui [15] and Kaneko and Kline [12, 13, 14], explores this issue and
captures how a player inductively derives his/her knowledge and beliefs of
the game from experiences.
Inductive game theory distinguishes an objective situation and players’
personal views of the game. Players are assumed to have little initial knowl-
edge about the objective situation, but repetitively face a given situation.
They therefore accumulate their experiences through their choices of avail-
able actions, and construct their personal views from their experiences. In
the players’ construction of personal views, the players have different per-
sonal views based on their different experiences even when the players face
an identical situation. Moreover, a player may have multiple views, some dif-
fering from the objective situation, which the player may revise with further
experiences.
The difference in players’ views is due not only to their experiences, but
also to their memories, which are represented by memory functions. By in-
troducing memory functions, players’ memory capacities can be represented
in various ways, although extensive games in standard game theory place
some restrictions on the representations. Therefore, even when gathering
many experiences, a player may only partially recall his experiences.
While inductive game theory provides a framework to derive a personal
view consistent with a player’s memories of the experiences, it has been less
studied how the derived view is revised by additional experiences. This paper
provides a framework for revision in inductive game theory based on the idea
of AGM (Alchourro´n-Ga¨rdenfors-Makinson) theory of belief revision [1]. By
introducing the revision process, we reflect a player’s inductive inference in
decision-making.
Since standard game theory assumes players to have sufficient knowledge
or common belief of the structure, it is not good at treating inductive in-
ferences of the structure. Revision of beliefs in (epistemic) logic has also
been applied to standard game theory as in Binmore [2], Bonnano [4], van
Benthem [17], Board [3], and Feinberg [6, 7]1. However, such studies usually
1A theory of belief revision in itself is now a very active area of research, and it connects
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focus on beliefs about opponent players’ actions. While it is important to
consider belief formations of opponents’ actions in interactive situations, we
need to ask whether such beliefs are plausible when the formation heavily de-
pends on (common) knowledge of the structure. Inductive game theory and
this paper truly ask the question: How do players cognize the (interactive)
situations that they face?
Our logic is based on standard classical propositional logic. Basic state-
ments in inductive game theory, such as the histories of players’ actions and
payoffs are associated with propositional atomic formulas, thereby describ-
ing causality relations between histories or players’ strategies as compound
formulas. In terms of this language, a player’s belief state is described by a
belief set of formulas; thus, a revision process for the belief states is described
using a revision operation in AGM theory. In this setting, the player’s per-
sonal views are described as models for the current belief set (i.e., assign-
ments of truth values that satisfy all the formulas of the belief set) in the
semantics.
By means of this logic, we also present an application to festival games,
which are specific inductive games proposed by Kaneko and Matsui [15]. As
explained above, the players in inductive games accumulate their experiences
and inductively derive their personal views of the experiences. Festival games
capture the mechanisms of prejudices and discriminations resulting from
experiences. We demonstrate that our logic handles the revision process
that generates prejudices and discriminations.
This paper is organized as follows. The following section gives the def-
inition of inductive game theory following Kaneko and Kline [14]. Section
3 presents our logic for belief revision. Section 4 presents an application of
our belief revision to festival games. Finally, Section 5 gives conclusions and
discusses further research.
2. Inductive Game Theory
2.1. Information protocols
We define an information protocol Π below. Let W be a nonempty finite
set of information pieces, A be a nonempty finite set of actions, and ≺ be a
finite subset of
⋃∞
m=0((W × A)m ×W ). Aw ⊆ A is the available action at
w ∈ W . When m = 0, (W × A)0 ×W is regarded as W of a unary relation
on W .
with dynamic epistemic logic. Comprehensive surveys were published by van Ditmarsch,
et al. [5], van der Hoek and Pauly [10].
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The relation ≺ is called a causality relation. Each element 〈(w1, a1), . . . ,
(wm, am), wm+1〉 ∈≺ is called a sequence of length m+ 1. Expression 〈ξ, w〉
denotes a generic element of
⋃∞
m=0((W × A)m × W ), and 〈w〉 is that of
(W × A)0 ×W . Using a causal relation ≺, we give a partition on W . That
is, WD := {w ∈W | 〈(w, a), v〉 for some a ∈ A and v ∈W} is called a set of
decision pieces and WE :=W \WD a set of end pieces.
Now let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players for an information pro-
tocol Π. Player assignment is a function pi : W → 2N that pi(w) as-
signs a single player for any w ∈ WD and N for any w ∈ WE . Player
i’s payoff assignment is given as a function hi : WE → R for all i ∈ N .
We then complete the definition of an information protocol as a quintuple
Π = (W,A,≺, (pi, N), (hi)i∈N ).
To describe a player’s personal view and an objective situation with
information protocols, we require two basic axioms and three non-basic ax-
ioms. To stipulate the basic axioms, we define a subsequence of a sequence in⋃∞
m=0((W ×A)m×W ). We say that 〈(w1, a1), . . . , (wm, am), wm+1〉 is a sub-
sequence of 〈(v1, b1), . . . , (vk, bk), vk+1〉 iff [(w1, a1), . . . , (wm, am), (wm+1, a)]
is a subsequence of [(v1, b1), . . . , (vk, bk), (vk+1, b)] for some a and b. We use
the notation 〈ξ, wm+1〉 ( 〈ζ, vk+1〉 to state that 〈ξ, wm+1〉 is a subsequence
of 〈ζ, vk+1〉. A supersequence is defined likewise. A sequence 〈ξ, w〉 is max-
ial iff there is no proper supersequence in ≺. A position 〈ξ, v〉 is an initial
segment of some maximal sequence. The set of positions is denoted Ξ.
We now state the basic axioms.
Axiom B1 If 〈ξ, w〉 ∈≺ and 〈ζ, v〉 ( 〈ξ, w〉, then 〈ζ, v〉 ∈≺.
Axiom B2 If 〈ξ, w〉 ∈≺ and w ∈ WD, then there are a ∈ A and v ∈ W
such that 〈ξ, (w, a), v〉 ∈≺.
Axiom B1 requires that≺ is closed under a subsequence relation, while axiom
B2 states that a sequence ending with a decision piece can be extended to
a longer sequence in ≺. When an information protocol satisfies these basic
axioms, we call it a basic protocol.
As we shall see in the next subsection, basic protocols are used to de-
scribe a player’s personal views. On the other hand, to describe an objective
situation, inductive game theory introduces the concept of the full protocol,
which is a restricted form of basic protocols. For the detailed definition of
full protocols, see [14].
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2.2. Players’ memories and inductively derived views
The central idea behind inductive game theory is the consideration of a
player’s memories, from which he/she derives a personal view of the objective
situation. Kaneko and Kline [14] formulated a player’s memories in terms
of a memory function, which maps each objective history of his/her play to
the recollection in the player’s mind.
Definition 2.1 (Memory function). Let Π be a basic protocol and Ξi the
set of player i’s positions in Π; i.e., Ξi = {〈ξ, w〉 ∈ Ξ | i ∈ pi(w)}. A
memory function mi for player i is a function mapping each element in a set
Di with Ξi ⊆ Di ⊆ Ξ to a finite sequence 〈ζ, v〉 = 〈(v1, b1), . . . , (vm, bm), v〉
satisifying two conditions: (1) v = w; and (2) m ≥ 0 and vt ∈ W , bt ∈ Avt
for all t = 1, . . . ,m.
Here the set Di, called a domain of accumulation (or a domain, for short)
is the objective description of player i’s accumulated experiences. Condition
1 guarantees that the latest information piece is what player i receives at
the current position. Condition 2 is a minimal requirement to represent
players’ memories with information protocols. The above memory functions
can represent players’ forgetfulness or incorrect recollections. We call each
sequence 〈ζ, v〉 given by mi a memory thread, and each component (vt, bt) or
vm+1 a memory knot. The memory function of player i takes all of player i’s
perceptions of the objective world; i.e., each player recognizes an objective
world only through his/her memory function.
We now present a basic framework for an objective world.
Definition 2.2 (Objective situation). An objective situation is a pair
(Πo,mo) such that Πo = (W o, Ao,≺o, (pi0, N), ho) is a full protocol with
ho = (ho1, . . . , h
o
n) and m
o = (mo1, . . . ,m
o
n) is an n-tuple of memory functions
in Πo.
On the other hand, a player’s personal view derived from his/her memo-
ries is formulated in terms of the memory function. Let Ξo be a set of posi-
tions in an objective situation (Πo,moi ). For a domain Di with Ξ
i ⊆ Di ⊆ Ξo,
the memory kit TDi , which describes the accumulated experiences in the
mind of player i, is defined as TDi := {moi 〈ξ, w〉 | 〈ξ, w〉 ∈ Di}. Basic
experiences for player i are the set of all subsequences of every sequence in
TDi , denoted ∆TDi . In terms of the basic experiences, we define a player’s
inductively derived view (or i.d.view, for short) as follows 2.
2The original definition in [14] requires one additional condition that mi is a perfect-
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Figure 1. Player 1’s i.d.views in the absent-minded driver game
Definition 2.3 (I.d.view). Suppose the objective situation (Πo,mo) is fixed.
A pair (Πi,mi) of a protocol and a memory function for player i is called an
inductively derived view from a memory kit TDi iff
ID1 W i := {w ∈ W o | w occurs in some sequence in TDi}, W iD ⊆ W oD
and W iE ⊆W oE ;
ID2 Aiw ⊆ Aow for each w ∈W i;
ID3 ∆TDi ⊆≺i;
ID4 pii(w) = pio(w) if w ∈ W iD and pii(w) = N i if w ∈ W iE , where
N i := {j ∈ No | j ∈ pii(w) for some w ∈W iD};
ID5 hi(w) = hoi (w) for all w ∈W iE .
In closing this section, to help readers understand the definition of in-
ductive game theory, we present a simple example called the absent-minded
driver game [14].
Example 2.4. Consider the one-player protocol (Πo,mo1) described by the
upper figure in Fig 1 (C). Now suppose that player 1 plays the game Πo
three times and experiences the sequences leading to w1, w2, and w3 in this
order. After each of the plays, the objective history of his/her behavior is
described as the following sequence: D01 := φ, D
1
1 := {〈(w, e), w1〉}, D21 :=
D11 ∪ {〈(w, c), (w, e), w2〉}, D31 := D21 ∪ {〈(w, c), (w, c), w3〉}.
Let us consider the memory functions mR1 describing that player 1 can
recall only the latest memory knots within his experiences; that is, mR1 is
information memory function (i.e., mi〈ξ, w〉 = 〈ξ, w〉). However, we omit this condition
in this paper since our formulation does not explicitly treat the classification of memory
functions.
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defined as mR1〈w〉 = 〈w〉, mR1〈(w, c), w〉 = 〈(w, c), w〉, mR1〈(w, e), w1〉 =
〈(w, e), w1〉, mR1〈(w, c), (w, e), w2〉 = 〈(w, e), w2〉, mR1〈(w, c), (w, c), w3〉 =
〈(w, c), w3〉.
Thus, the corresponding sequence of basic experiences is ∆T 0D1 := φ,
∆T 1D1 := {〈w〉, 〈(w, e), w1〉}, ∆T 2D1 := ∆T 1D1 ∪ {〈(w, c), w〉, 〈(w, e), w2〉},
∆T 3D1 := ∆T
2
D1
∪ {〈(w, c), w3〉}, and some of the player’s i.d.views obtained
from the basic experiences are depicted as figures (A)–(C) in Fig. 1.
As the example shows, we may consider (possibly an infinite number of)
multiple i.d.views that differ from the objective situation, examples of which
are given as the lower figures of (B) and (C) in Fig 1, respectively.
3. Logical Formulation of Inductive Game Theory
In this section, we first briefly overview the AGM theory of belief revision
[1] and then present our logical formulation of inductive game theory. We
here introduce a minimal setting that formulates a player’s beliefs about
experienced sequences. An extension, including the concepts of a player’
strategy and payoff, is considered in the next section.
3.1. AGM theory of belief revision
We suppose a propositional language L over a finite alphabet Σ of propo-
sitional atomic variables s, t, . . . , s1, s2, . . . with the usual sentential con-
nectives (¬, ∧, ∨, →, and ↔). Propositional formulas are denoted by
ϕ,ψ, . . . ,ϕ1,ϕ2, . . ..
As the syntax for L, we suppose the usual inference system of classical
propositional logic. Consequence relation . is defined by this logic. The set
of all logical consequences of a set Γ ⊆ L (i.e., the set {ϕ | Γ . ϕ}) is denoted
Cn(Γ). Deductively closed sets of propositional formulas (i.e., K = Cn(K)),
are denoted K,K ′, . . . and are called belief sets.
As the semantics for L, we suppose the usual truth assignment and mod-
els of propositional logic. A truth assignment is a function σ : Σ → {1, 0}.
A truth assignment σ is called a model of a proposition ϕ if σ satisfies ϕ in
the classical sense. A model of a set of propositions Γ is a truth assignment
σ that satisfies all ϕ ∈ Γ.
The AGM theory of belief revision considers three types of operations on
belief sets: expansion +˙, contraction −˙ and revision (. For a belief setK and
a formula ϕ, the expansion operation is defined as K+˙ϕ := Cn(K ∪ {ϕ}).
The contraction operation is assumed to satisfy the following postulates.
P1 K−˙ϕ is a theory;
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P2 K−˙ϕ ⊆ K;
P3 If ϕ 0∈ K then K−˙ϕ = K;
P4 If 0. ϕ then ϕ 0∈ K−˙ϕ;
P5 If ϕ ∈ K then K ⊆ (K−˙ϕ)+˙ϕ;
P6 If . ϕ↔ ψ then K−˙ϕ = K−˙ψ;
P7 (K−˙ϕ) ∩ (K−˙ψ) ⊆ K−˙(ϕ ∧ ψ);
P8 If ϕ 0∈ K−˙(ϕ ∧ ψ) then K−˙(ϕ ∧ ψ) ⊆ K−˙ϕ.
The revision operation can be defined by Levy identity, i.e. K ( ϕ :=
(K−˙¬ϕ)+˙ϕ (cf. Chapter 1 in [9]).
3.2. Logical formulation
As explained in the previous section, in inductive game theory, a unique ob-
jective situation is described by a pair (Πo,mo) of full protocol and memory
functions, while a player’s accumulated memories are described by basic ex-
periences ∆TDi . Thus, an accumulation process for the memories of player
i can be represented by a sequence ∆T 0Di ,∆T
1
Di
, . . . which is obtained from
a sequence D0i , D
1
i , . . . of his/her objective histories.
Our logical formulation of inductive game theory comprises the follow-
ing steps. We first fix the propositional language L whose atomic formulas
are used to denote statements of the form “a sequence 〈ξ, w〉 may occur”.
Thus, relations over sequences, such as negation and causality, can be rep-
resented by (compound) formulas. We next define a player’s belief state
as a belief set, which consists of beliefs about experienced sequences and
some ex-ante beliefs about causality relations over sequences. For a given
sequence ∆T 0Di ,∆T
1
Di
, . . . of basic experiences, the corresponding sequence
K0i ,K
1
i , . . . of belief sets is defined by the revision operator in AGM the-
ory. On the other hand, as explained in the previous subsection, we can
obtain (possibly multiple) i.d.views from given basic experiences ∆T jDi . In
our framework, an i.d.view (Πi,mi) is defined by an assignment function σ
such that σ(〈ξ, w〉) = 1 if and only if 〈ξ, w〉 ∈≺i. Finally, we show that any
assignment σ obtained from ∆TDi is a model for belief set Ki obtained from
∆TDi . This means that a player’s i.d.view can be regarded as a personal
view constructed from the current belief state.
We here fix the objective situation (Πo,mo) = (W o,
Ao,≺o, (pio, No), ho,mo), the sequence D0i , D1i , . . . of domains, and the cor-
responding sequences ∆T 0Di ,∆T
1
Di
, . . . of basic experiences. For convention,
we consider the initial domain D0i := φ.
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The language L is defined as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Language). The propositional language L is defined by
considering an alphabet Σ that provides a sufficient number of atomic propo-
sitions to denote any sequence in ≺o. That is, we suppose that there is a
bijective mapping ∗ : Σ→≺o.
To simplify our discussion, throughout we omit sequences whose length
is 1; i.e., sequences of the form 〈w〉.
Next, for ∆T 0Di ,∆T
1
D2
, . . ., we define the corresponding sequence of the
player’s belief sets.
Definition 3.2 (Belief sets). Suppose that∆T j+1Di is obtained from∆T
j
Di
by
adding a sequence 〈ζ, v〉 ∈≺o for each j = 0, 1, . . .. That is, ∆T j+1Di := ∆T
j
Di
∪
{〈ζ, v〉}. (If ∆T j+1Di \ ∆T
j
Di
includes multiple sequences, then the following
rules are applied one by one to each of the sequences.) The corresponding
sequence of player i’s belief sets K0i ,K
1
i , . . . is inductively defined as follows.
• For each j = 0, 1, . . ., Kji is defined to be the deductive closure of the
union of two kinds of sets Kji,EX (called experienced beliefs) and K
j
i,CA
(called beliefs about causality), and K0i is fixed as
R1-1 K0i,EX := {¬s | s ∈ Σ and the length of s∗ is 2},
R1-2 K0i,CA := {s→ t | s, t ∈ Σ and t∗ ( s∗}.
• For given Kji = Cn(Kji,EX ∪Kji,CA), the belief set Kj+1i is defined by
R2-1 Kj+1i,EX := K
j
i,EX\{¬t | t ∈ Σ, and s∗ ( 〈ζ, v〉} ∪ {s | s∗ = 〈ζ, v〉}
R2-2 Kj+1i,CA := K
j
i,CA.
Intuitively, R1-1 represents the player’s initial belief in the impossibility
of any elementary sequence. R1-2 and R2-2 represent the persistent belief
about causality; i.e., if a sequence may occur then its subsequence also may
occur. R2-1 represents the belief that any experienced sequence may occur.
For this formulation, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 3.3. For a given objective situation (Πo,mo) and sequence of basic
experiences ∆T 0Di ,∆T
1
Di
, . . . obtained from a sequence of domains D0i , D
1
i , . . .,
the corresponding sequence K0i ,K
1
i , . . . can be characterized by revision op-
eration ( in AGM theory.
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Proof. Using the Levy identity, it is enough to show that R2-1 in Definition
3.2 can be characterized by contraction and expansion operations. That is,
for any s ∈ Σ with s∗ = 〈ξ, w〉, if we define the operation of R2-1 as Kj+1i :=
(Kji −˙¬s)+˙s, then −˙ and +˙ satisfy postulates P1–P8 and the condition that
(Kji +˙s) = Cn(K
j
i ∪ {s}), respectively. Clearly, operation +˙ is an expansion
operator in AGM theory. We here only consider the case for P3 of −˙, since
the other cases are trivial or shown by similar argument. If ¬s 0∈ Kji , then
¬t 0∈ Kji for any t with t∗ ( s∗ because s→ t ∈ Kji . Therefore, by definition,
R2-1, Kji −˙¬s = Kji .
As a corollary of this theorem, any belief set appearing in a sequence
K0i ,K
1
i , . . . is consistent. This indicates that our logic formulates a revision
process where the player always constructs a consistent belief state from
experiences.
Finally, for given basic experiences ∆T jDi (j = 0, 1, . . .), we define the
corresponding assignment function as follows.
Definition 3.4 (Assignment function). For each ∆T jDi (j = 0, 1, . . .), the
corresponding assignment σji is an assignment satisfying the following con-
ditions.
A1 For any s, t ∈ Σ with t∗ ( s∗, if σji (s) = 1 then σji (t) = 1.
A2 For any s ∈ Σ, if σji (s) = 1 and s∗ ∈ WD then there exists t ∈ Σ such
that s∗ ( t∗ and σji (t) = 1.
A3 For any s ∈ Σ such that the length of s∗ is 2, if s 0( 〈ξ, w〉 for all
〈ξ, w〉 ∈ ∆T jDi then σ
j
i (s) = 0.
A4 For any s ∈ Σ, if s∗ ∈ ∆T jDi then σ
j
i (s) = 1.
A5 Any s∗ with σ(s) = 1 satisfies conditions ID1, ID2, and ID4 in the
definition of i.d.view (i.e., Definition 2.3).
Intuitively, A1 and A2 respectively correspond to the basic axioms B1
and B2. A3 means that a sequence consisting of any unexperienced sequence
does not appear in the i.d.view. A4 represents condition ID3 in the definition
of i.d.view. A5 stipulates that the set of sequences determined by σji satisfies
all the conditions except for ID3 in the definition of i.d.view. With A5, we
restrict our attention to the assignments that can be regarded as an i.d.view.
By condition A4 in Definition 3.4, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 3.5. Suppose that an objective situation (Πo,mo) and a sequence
of domains D0i , D
1
i , . . . in (Π
o,mo) are given. For j = 0, 1, . . ., let ∆T jDi be
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basic experiences and Kji be the belief set obtained from ∆T
j
Di
. If σji is an
assignment function obtained from ∆T jDi, then σ
j
i is a model for K
j
i .
In closing this section, we demonstrate a revision process for a player’s
beliefs in terms of our logic in the case of the absent-minded driver game
presented in Example 2.4.
Example 3.6. Consider the protocol (Πo,mo1) described as the left figure in
Fig 1. Propositional atoms and the bijective mapping ∗ from Σ to ≺o are
fixed as
s∗1 = 〈(w, e), w1〉,
s∗2 = 〈(w, c), (w, e), w2〉,
s∗3 = 〈(w, c), (w, c), w3〉,
s∗4 = 〈(w, c), w〉,
s∗5 = 〈(w, e), w2〉,
s∗6 = 〈(w, c), w3〉,
s∗7 = 〈(w, c), (w, e), w1〉.
In fact, infinitely many sequences other than those in the list above can be
considered, but for simplicity, we here focus attention on sequences whose
length is less than 3. Let us consider the situation that player 1 repeatedly
plays the game and accumulates experiences. Suppose that the process of
accumulation is D0, . . . , D3, such that D0 := φ, and Dj := Dj−1 ∪ {s∗j}
for each j =1, 2, and 3. If the player’s memory function is assumed to be
mR1, the corresponding sequence of basic experiences ∆T 0D, . . . ,∆T
3
D is φ,
{s∗1}, {s∗1, s∗4, s∗5}, {s∗1, s∗4, s∗5, s∗6}. For this sequence, the revision process of
the belief sets is
K0Ex := {¬s1,¬s4,¬s5,¬s6},
K0CA := {s2 → s4 ∧ s5, s3 → s4 ∧ s6, s7 → s1 ∧ s4},
K1Ex := {s1,¬s4,¬s5,¬s6},
K2Ex := {s1, s4, s5,¬s6},
K3Ex := {s1, s4, s5, s6},
where KjCA = K
0
CA for j = 1, 2, 3. Note that for ∆T
1
D, both ¬s2 and
¬s3 are derivable, while for ∆T 2D and for ∆T 3D, none of s2, s3, s7 or their
negations can be derived. On the other hand, the corresponding sequence
of assignment functions (denoted σj) is defined as
σ0(si) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , 7,
σ1(s1) = 1, σ(si) = 0 for i = 2, . . . , 7,
σ2(s1) = σ2(s4) = σ2(s5) = 1, σ2(s3) = σ2(s6) = 0,
σ3(s1) = σ(s3) = σ3(s4) = σ3(s5) = σ3(s6) = 1.
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For both σ2 and σ3, any values are possible for s2 and s7. This results in
multiple i.d.views. For example, in the case that σ2(s2) = 1 and σ2(s7) = 0,
the corresponding i.d.view is the upper figure in Fig 1 (B), while in the case
that σ2(s2) = 0 and σ2(s7) = 0, it is the lower figure in Fig 1 (C).
4. Application to Festival Games
In this section, we apply our logic to a specific inductive game, the festival
game, which was developed by Kaneko and Matsui [15] and Kaneko and
Mitra [16]. The main objective in this section is to formulate the festival
games in terms of our logic, thereby showing the revision process of players’
beliefs. Especially, we focus attention on the process where players’ prejudice
is exposed as discriminatory behaviors caused by their experiences. For this
objective, we first introduce the definition of festival games following [15]
and then present the formulation of festival games in terms of our logic.
4.1. Festival games
The festival game considers that each of the players belongs to an ethnic
group, and the player’s festival location is chosen. Each player then decides
his attitude, friendly or unfriendly, after observing ethnic groups at his loca-
tion. Using this framework, Kaneko and Matsui [15] studied how prejudices,
as a fallacious image of ethnic groups, arise from players’ experiences and
how discrimination arises as an unfriendly attitude.
Let us define the objective situation (Πo,mo) = (W o, Ao,≺o, (pio, N), ho,
mo) for festival games. We consider the number of ethnic groups ). The set
N = {1, . . . , n} of players is then partitioned into ethnic groups, e1, . . . , e!
with |Nj | ≥ 2 for j = 1, . . . , ). The set Ao of actions consists of the choices of
festival locations, {f1, . . . , fm}, and the attitude, friendly or unfriendly, de-
noted by frd and unfrd, respectively. That is, Ao = {f1, . . . , fm}∪{frd, unfrd}.
The festival game consists of two stages: the first stage of choosing festival
locations and the second stage of acting in festivals. Since the first stage is
indeed a simultaneous decision stage, we assume that player i chooses his/her
festival location at the position
〈ξ1, w1i 〉 = 〈(w11, l1), . . . , (w1i−1, ln), w2i 〉
with i ≤ n, and l1, . . . , li−1 ∈ {f1, . . . , fm}. At that position, the player
obtains a memory thread mi〈ξ1, w1i 〉 = 〈w1i 〉. This means that the play-
ers decide their festival locations in order of their indices, but each cannot
observe the choices of the other players before making the decision.
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In the second stage, player i’s position is given as
〈ξ2i , w2i 〉 = 〈(w11, l1), . . . , (w1n, ln), (w21, a1), . . . , (w2i−1, ai−1), w2i 〉
with i ≤ n, and a1, . . . , ai−1 ∈ {frd, unfrd}. For the position 〈ξ2i , w2i 〉, player
i obtains a memory thread as mi〈ξ2i , w2i 〉 = 〈(w1i , li), w2i 〉. Unlike the set-
ting of Kaneko and Matsui [15], information piece w2i conveys to player i
information about the number of participants in festival fj with li = fj for
each ethnicity group. Formally, this information (denoted Ej) is defined
by Ej = (x1, x2, . . . , x!)j , where xk indicates the number of participants in
ethnic group k = 1, . . . , ). We use notation w2i = Ej to denote that player i
receives ethnic configuration Ej .
Finally, player i’s position after the second stage is given as
〈ξ3, w3j 〉 = 〈(w11, l1), . . . , (w1n, ln), (w21, a1), . . . , (w2n, an), w3j 〉
with w3j ∈ WE . Here, j = 1, . . . ,m|N | · 2|N | since the resulting position is
determined by the players’ choices of locations (among m alternatives) and
attitude (between frd and unfrd). For the position 〈ξ3, w3j 〉, player i obtains
a memory thread as mi〈ξ3, w3j 〉 = 〈(w1i , li), (w2i , ai), w3j 〉. The information
piece w3j provides the numerical payoffs.
According to the above setting, ≺o consists of m|N | · 2|N | maximal se-
quences of the form 〈ξ3, w3j 〉 and their subsequences. The set W o is deter-
mined by ≺o, and pi is defined such that pi(wji ) = {i} for any wji ∈W oD and
pi(w3j ) = N for any w
3
j ∈WE .
For determination of players’ payoffs ho = (ho1, . . . , h
o
n), we first intro-
duce players’ strategies. A strategy of player i (denoted sti) is a pair (li, ri)
of choices for the first and second stages. Here, ri is a function mapping
{f1, . . . , fm}× E to {frd, unfrd}, where E is the collection of all possible eth-
nicity configurations. We here note that every player may change strategy in
the recurrent plays of the game (Πo,mo). To indicate strategy st′i that is de-
viated from sti by replacing the choice of location li with l′i, we use expression
sti[li/l′i]. The replacement of a player’s attitude is indicated analogously.
Let Si be the set of strategies for player i. For a strategy profile st ∈
S1 × · · ·× Sn, the player’s payoff is determined by his/her attitude and the
mood of the location he/she chose. The mood of festival fk with fk = li for
player i (denoted µi) is given by the number of friendly people at li other
than player i; i.e., µi(l, r) =
∑
lj=li,j &=i rj(lj , Ej), where l = (l1, . . . , ln),
r = (r1, . . . , rn), and frd and unfrd are interpreted as 1 and 0, respectively.
We then define the payoff function of player i as hi(li, ri) = ri(li, Ei) ·µ(l, r).
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4.2. Logical formulation of festival games
To give a logical formulation of the above example, we here extend our logic
introduced in the previous section to capture the concepts of strategies and
payoffs. We first introduce the following language:
Definition 4.1 (Language for festival games). The language L is defined
by fixing the alphabet Σ to denote:
• occurrence of any sequence in ≺o,
• statements of the form “player i chooses fj as his festival location,” de-
noted li = fj ,
• statements of the form “the ethnicity configuration at festival fj is Ej”
(denoted Ej),
• statements of the form “player i chooses frd (unfrd) as his attitude in the
festival he chose,” denoted ai = frd (ai = unfrd, respectively),
• statements of the form “player i’s payoff is x”, denoted payoffi = x.
For readability, we introduce equational expressions instead of single
characters to denote these propositional atoms.
In terms of this language, we next give the definition of the sequence of
player i’s belief sets, K0i ,K
1
i , . . .. The idea behind our definition is as fol-
lows. In addition to Definition 3.2, we also consider the player’s belief about
his/her current strategy and experienced ethnicity configurations. Strategy
sti = (li, ri) with li = fk, ri(li, Ej) = frd/unfrd is described as the set of
formulas li = fk ∧ (li = fk ∧ Ek) → {frd, unfrd} for all Ek ∈ E, where the
expression {frd, unfrd} denotes one of frd and unfrd. The latest decisions of
location and attitude, as well as the resulting payoff, are uniquely determined
in the current belief set.
Definition 4.2 (Belief sets in festival games). Suppose that ∆T j+1Di is ob-
tained by adding a sequence 〈ζ, v〉 ∈≺o for each j = 0, 1, . . .. That is,
∆T j+1Di := ∆T
j
Di
∪ {〈ζ, v〉}. Let stji = (fj , ri) be a strategy of player i at
the j-th play of the game. (For convention, we consider st0i := st
1
i .) The
corresponding sequence of his/her belief setsK1i ,K
2
i , . . . is defined as follows.
• For each j = 0, 1, . . ., Kji is defined to be the deductive closure of the
union of four kinds of sets Kji,EX, K
j
i,CA, K
j
i,ST, K
j
i,AUX (where the third
and fourth are respectively called beliefs about strategy and auxiliary be-
liefs), and K0i is fixed as:
R1-1 K0i,EX := {¬s | s ∈ Σ and the length of s∗ is 2},
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R1-2 K0i,CA := {s→ t | s, t ∈ Σ and t∗ ( s∗}
∪{li = fj ↔ ¬li = fk | k 0= j, j ≥ l, k ≥ m}
∪{Ej ↔ ¬Ek | Ej 0= Ek, Ej , Ek ∈ E}
∪{ai = {frd, unfrd}↔ ¬ai = {unfrd, frd}}
∪{li = fk∧Eh → {frd, unfrd}↔ ¬(li = fk∧Eh → {frd, unfrd})}
∪{payoffi = x→ ¬payoffi = x′ | x 0= x′},
R1-3 K0i,ST := {fj} ∪ {fj ∧ Ej → ai = {frd, unfrd} | Ej ∈ E, {frd, unfrd}
is determined by r0i in st
0
i },
R1-4 K0i,AUX := {(s → payoffi = x) ∧ (s′ → payoffi = x′) → ¬s |
x < x′}.
• For given Kji = Cn(Kji,EX ∪Kji,CA ∪Kji,ST ∪Kji,AUX), the belief set Kj+1i
is defined by
R2-1 (1) Kj+1i := Θ \ {¬s | s ∈ Σ and s∗ ( 〈ζ, v〉} ∪ {s | s∗ = 〈ζ, v〉},
where Θ is obtained by the following rules R2-1 (2)–(4):
R2-1 (2) if 〈ζ, v〉 = 〈(w1i , fk), w2i 〉, then Θ := Kji,EX \ {¬li = fk} ∪ {li =
fk},
R2-1 (3) if 〈ζ, v〉 = 〈(w1i , fk), w2i 〉 where w2i = Ek, then Θ := Kji,EX \
{¬Ek} ∪ {Ek},
R2-1 (4) if 〈ζ, v〉 = 〈(w1i , fk), (w2i , ai), w3〉 where w2i = Ek and hi(w3) =
x, then Θ := Kji,EX \ {¬ϕ}∪ {ϕ} where ϕ ≡ li = fk ∧ (li = fk ∧Ek →
ai = {frd, unfrd})→ payoffi = x},
R2-2 Kj+1i,CA := K
j
i,CA,
R2-3 (1) if stj+1i = st
j
i [fk/fh], then K
j+1
i,ST := K
j
i,ST \ {¬li = fh} ∪ {li =
fh},
R2-3 (2) if stj+1i = st
j
i [ri/r
′
i], thenK
j+1
i,ST := K
j
i,ST\{¬ρi}∪{ρi} where ρi
is a formula of the form
∧
k=1,...,m, E∈E(li = fk∧E → ai = {frd, unfrd})
determined by ri,
R2-4 Kj+1i,AUX := K
j
i,AUX.
Intuitively, R1-1 and R2-1 revise the beliefs about experienced sequences,
while R1-2 and R2-2 refer to the beliefs about causality. These are essentially
the same as Definition 3.2, but R1-2 is extended to maintain the uniqueness
of choices of locations, attitude, the resulting payoff, and ethncity configu-
rations. R1-3 and R2-3 revise the current strategy. Finally, R1-4 and R2-4
revise the player’s strategy if there is another strategy that can improve on
the latest payoff.
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We here note that for all the operations in the above definition except
for the belief revision for experienced sequences, every removed formula is
identical to the negation of the corresponding added formula. Thus, if we
consider the subtraction (\) and the addition (∪) to be −˙ and +˙, respectively,
these operations clearly satisfy postulates P1–P8 and the condition that
Kji +˙ϕ = Cn(K
j
i ∪ {ϕ}). Therefore, by this fact and Theorem 3.3, we can
prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3. For a given objective situation (Πo,mo) in a festival game,
sequence of basic experiences ∆T 0Di ,∆T
1
Di
, . . ., and sequence of strategies
st0i , st
1
i , . . ., the corresponding sequence K
0
i ,K
1
i , . . . defined by Definition 4.2
can be realized by revision operation ( in AGM theory.
Moreover, by our construction of the initial belief set, K0i , and by this
theorem, every belief set appearing in the sequence is guaranteed to be
consistent.
We finally define assignment functions that are obtained from given basic
experiences and a player’s strategy.
Definition 4.4 (Assignment functions). For each ∆T jDi and the strategy
stji of the j-th play of the game for player i, the corresponding assignment
σji is an assignment function satisfying conditions A1–A5 in Definition 3.4
and the following.
A6 σ(li = fk) = 1 iff (w1i , fk) appears in the sequence 〈ξj,3, wj,3〉.
A7 σ(Ek) = 1 iff f1, . . . , fm appears in the sequence 〈ξj,3, wj,3〉 and Ek is the
ethnicity configuration derived from f1, . . . , fm.
A8 σ(ai = frd) = 1 iff (w
j,2
i , frd) appears in the sequence 〈ξj,3, wj,3〉.
Intuitively, A6 means that player i chooses fj as his/her location. A7
represents the location configuration. A8 means that player i chooses frd
(or unfrd) as the attitude. For these semantics, the following theorem still
holds.
Theorem 4.5. Suppose that an objective situation (Πo,moi ) and a sequence
of domains D0i , D
1
i , . . . in (Π
o,moi ) are given. For j = 0, 1, . . ., let ∆T
j
Di
be
basic experiences, stji be the strategy of player i, and K
j
i be the belief set
obtained from ∆T jDi. If σ
j
i is an assignment function obtained from ∆T
j
Di
,
then σji is a model for K
j
i .
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

 

 





 



 

 

Figure 2. Example of a festival game
4.3. Example
To demonstrate a revision process in our logic, we finally consider the fol-
lowing example.
Example 4.6 (Festival game). Let N = {1, . . . , 5} be the set of players
consisting of two ethnicity groups e1 = {1, 2, 3} and e2 = {4, 5}. We consider
three repeated plays of the game depicted in Fig 2. In the first play of the
game, players 1, 2 and 4 go to festival f1, while players 3 and 5 go to festival
f2. Here, all the players in f1 behave in a friendly manner, because they do
not have any prejudice against different ethnicities, whereas the players in f2
discriminate against different ethnicities, and thus behave in an unfriendly
manner. In the second play, all players maintain their strategy, except that
player 1 changes location. After the play, player 1 returns to f1 having
some prejudice against e2 as he experienced player 5’s unfriendly attitude
in f2. Thus, player 1 changes his strategy for attitude; however, player 1’s
prejudice is not exposed as discriminatory behavior whenever his ethnicity
is a majority at his location. Finally, in the third play, player 4 comes to
location f1. This results in a situation that e1 becomes the major ethnicity,
and player 1 then takes an unfriendly attitude.
We here focus on the revision of player 1’s beliefs and suppose his/her
perfect recall memory function. Let Dj1 be the domain consisting of the
experienced sequences up to the end of the j-th play of the game (for j =
0, . . . , 3). For readability, we identify the expression for sequences with the
corresponding atomic formulas.
In the first play of the game, strategy st11 of player 1 is described as the
following functions for given positions 〈v1i 〉 and 〈(v1i , li), v2i 〉.
• st11〈v1i 〉 = f1,
• st11〈(v1i , li), v2i 〉 = frd for any Ej with li = fj .
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The strategy is that a friendly attitude is taken whatever ethnicity configu-
ration is at the location.
According to Definition 4.2, player 1 has the initial belief set K01 consist-
ing of the following.
• ¬s for any sequence s∗ of length 2 in (Πo,mo) (by R1-1);
• li = f1 and
∧
Ej∈E(l1 = f1 ∧ Ej → ai = frd) (by R1-3);
• beliefs about causality (determined by R1-2 and R1-4).
At the end of the first play, new belief set K11 is obtained from K
0
1 by
the following revisions.
• Both ¬〈(w11, f1), w21〉 and ¬〈(w21, frd), w3〉 are removed, and then 〈(w11, f1),
(w21, frd), w
3〉 is added (by R2-1 (1));
• Ethnicity configuration (2, 1)1 is added (by R2-1 (3)), and the negation
of any other configuration can thus be derived by R1-2;
• l1 = f1 ∧ (l1 = f1 ∧ (2, 1)1 → a1 = frd) → payoff1 = 2 is added (by R2-1
(4)).
At the end of the second play, new belief set K21 is obtained by the
following revisions.
• Both ¬〈(w′11 , f2), w′21 〉 and ¬〈(w′21 , frd), w′3〉 are removed, and then
〈(w′11 , f2), (w′21 , frd), w′3〉 is added (by R2-1 (1));
• Ethnicity configuration (2, 1)2 is added (by R2-1 (3));
• ¬l1 = f2 (which is derived from the previous belief about location l1 = f1
and belief about causality l1 = f1 ↔ ¬l1 = f2) is removed, and then
l1 = f2 is added (by R2-3);
• l1 = f2 ∧ (l1 = f2 ∧ (2, 1)2 → frd)→ payoffi = 0 is added (by R2-1 (4)).
By accumulating experiences about payoffs, the player recognizes that the
deviation of location worsens the payoff. Thus, by (R1-4), it is suggested
that the player deviates from the current strategy; i.e., ¬l1 = f2 ∨ l1 =
f2 ∧ (2, 1)2 → frd is derived. The revised strategy st′′1 in the third play can
be defined as follows.
• st′′1〈v11〉 = f1,
• st′′1〈(v11, l1), v21〉 =
{
unfrd if x > 2y for Ej = (x, y) with l1 = fj
frd otherwise
.
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The intuitive meaning of this strategy is that the player’s hidden prejudice
is exposed as discriminatory behavior (i.e., the player takes an unfriendly
attitude) if his/her ethnicity becomes more than twice as large as e2. This
deviation results in the following belief revisions:
• Both ¬〈(w′′11 , f1), w′′21 〉 and ¬〈(w′′21 , unfrd), w′′31 〉 are removed, and then
〈(w′′11 , f1), (w′′21 , unfrd), w′′31 〉 is added (by R2-1 (1));
• ¬l1 = f1 is removed, and then l1 = f1 is added (by R2-3);
• ¬(2, 1)1 is removed, and then (3, 1)1 is added (by R2-1 (3));
• ¬(l1 = f2 ∧ (2, 1)2)→ a1 = frd) is removed, and then l1 = f1 ∧ (x, y)1 →
a1 = frd for x > 2 · y is added (by R2-1 (4)).
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper provided a dynamic framework to revise players’ personal views
of their experiences following inductive game theory. In addition, we applied
our framework to festival games to explain how prejudices and discrimination
emerge. In a subsequent paper, we will investigate festival games within our
framework.
We finally comment on our findings. First, our inductive derivation dif-
fers from learning theory approaches in the literature such as those of Fu-
denberg and Levine [8]. Standard learning theories do not focus on the
learning of structure, but on the learning of beliefs of opponents’ actions.
Second, while making use of the framework of inductive game theory devel-
oped by Kaneko and Kline and Kaneko and Matsui, our theory focuses on
a permanent revision process based on the player’s experiences. While the
developers of inductive game theory focused on how to construct a player’s
view consistent with his/her experiences, we focused on how to change a
player’s personal view when he/she has a new experience.
Finally, the treatment of experiences in our theory slightly differs from
the standard belief revision theory pioneered by Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors
and Makinson [1] (so-called AGM theory). In contrast to AGM theory, our
theory distinguishes between what a player originally believes and what he
logically derives from the original belief. This is based on our motivation that
the players are not simply a database, but have some logical abilities. This
approach is similar to the belief base theory, which distinguishes between
the belief base and the consequence.3 However, the theory of the belief base
focuses neither on the new observations as the experiences in our theory
3See Chapter 1 in Ga¨rdenfors [9].
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nor on their accumulation. Our theory combines the use of accumulated
observations and beliefs logically derived from them for decision-making.
In further research, we will investigate (i) how players with different
views make decisions in our theory and (ii) the direction of various players’
views after repetitive revision. In standard game theory, players face an
identical situation and know that even when considering incomplete infor-
mation games. Our theory is a first step to inquiring whether it is possible to
achieve and to analyze misunderstandings pointed out by Kaneko [11]. In a
society in which people do not necessarily recognize identical environments,
we wonder how people harmonize with each other. This question will drive
future research.
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